Join our Mailing List

Subscribe to our mailing list to receive regular email updates of ResPublica's work, upcoming events and recent blogs from the Disraeli Room.

The Disraeli Room

The Disraeli Room

Blog Post

Bitcoin is not anonymous

24th March 2015

Bitcoin is far more transparent than the cash and bank accounts we use today, says Tom Robinson, co-founder of Elliptic

The public image of bitcoin, cultivated by the media, is of the international criminal’s currency of choice – an anonymous, untraceable means of laundering proceeds of crime. This has made for compelling column inches, but the opposite is true. Bitcoin is in fact the most transparent payment method ever developed, and has the potential to become a powerful tool in the fight against financial crime.

On day nine of the trial of Ross Ulbricht, the prosecution called their key witness: Ilhwan Yum, an FBI special agent and cyber security expert. Ulbricht had been arrested in a San Francisco public library fifteen months earlier, and charged with being the owner and operator of Silk Road, the world’s largest online illegal marketplace. By using bitcoin as the only means of payment, the operators of the site hoped to maintain the anonymity of their users, who were primarily engaged in buying and selling illegal drugs. Over $1 billion in transactions took place on Silk Road between February 2011 and July 2013, and almost $80m of commissions were earned by the operators – all in bitcoins.

FBI Agent Yum’s testimony provided a clear and high-profile illustration of what those with a technical understanding of the digital currency already knew – that bitcoin transactions are anything but anonymous. Up until this point in the trial, Ulbricht’s defence team had maintained that he was not the operator of the Silk Road, and had merely created it before handing it over to others. Yum provided the smoking gun in the form of incontrovertible proof that over a 12-month period, more than 700,000 bitcoins had been transferred from the Silk Road bitcoin wallet directly to a wallet on Ross Ulbricht’s laptop.

To understand how this link could be made, we need to take a closer look at how bitcoin transactions work. In order to send or receive bitcoins, you need a bitcoin address – a string of letters and numbers. This address is analogous to an email address: you can send bitcoins to a bitcoin address in the same way as you can send emails to an email address. At the core of bitcoin is a public, online ledger recording every single transaction, for all to see, known as the blockchain. Agent Yum simply searched the bitcoin blockchain for transactions involving the bitcoin addresses found in the Silk Road wallet and those on Ross Ulbricht’s laptop – and bingo, he found direct transactions between them.

Now of course the blockchain does not record everything – Identities of the transacting parties are not recorded. So bitcoin is pseudonymous rather than anonymous – your pseudonym (bitcoin address) is recorded, but your identity isn’t. However in many cases identities can be linked to bitcoin addresses, and it is usually much easier than seizing someone’s laptop.

Any bitcoin transaction with a party that knows your identity leaks information that can be used to identify your activity, past and future, on the block chain.For example, if you transfer bitcoins to an online retailer, an exchange, or many of the other services that take customer identity information, you allow them to link that identity to your block chain pseudonym, potentially revealing the other transactions that you are party to.

Bitcoin therefore provides the ultimate paper trail for law enforcement agencies, tax authorities and compliance professionals. This traceability also makes bitcoin theft a far less attractive endeavour. Many tens of millions of pounds’ worth of bitcoins have been stolen from exchanges and wallet services over the past few years, but the thieves have been able to do very little with these stolen funds, because in most cases they have been identified on the block chain and forever “tainted” – the digital equivalent of blood-stained fifty pound notes.

Of course, bitcoin laundering tools, known as ‘mixers’ or ‘tumblers’, have sprung up. These services attempt to break up the paper trail by exchanging one set of bitcoins for another with different addresses and transaction histories. However these services have serious limitations – they tend not to work well for large volumes and the laundering process can itself often be identified on the blockchain.

We are only just starting to scratch the surface of what information can be mined from the open transaction ledger at the heart of bitcoin. As criminals develop more sophisticated laundering techniques, so others will develop more powerful tools to extract identifying information from the block chain and trace payments.

This also has serious implications for user privacy – we are on the whole comfortable with entrusting our financial information with banks, but opening up this transaction history for all to see on the blockchain may be too much for many. The laundering techniques employed by criminals may be indistinguishable from completely justified efforts by bitcoin users to mask their activity – but we must protect the right to maintain this privacy.

What is clear is that regulators and law enforcement agencies should not fear this technology, but embrace it. The transparency of digital currencies makes them an uncomfortable home for proceeds of crime.


Elliptic is a London-based digital asset custodian and provider of blockchain-based compliance services. www.elliptic.co

To find out more about the UK Digital Currency Association (UKDCA), please visit their website. Follow them on Twitter @UK_DCA.

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

Time limit is exhausted. Please reload CAPTCHA.

ResPublica Response to changes to the National Planning Policy Framework

The Government’s housing announcements on the 5th March were the first substantial change to the planning system since the Coalition reforms six years ago. The...

Food poverty: Time to lift the veil?

A century on from Charles Booth’s famous Poverty Map of London, accurate information on poverty has never been more important. So the findings of...

The Disraeli Room
ResPublica’s Response to the Industrial Strategy White Paper

Following the creation of the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy in July 2016 and firing the starting gun for a string of sector...

The Disraeli Room
ResPublica’s Response to the Autumn Budget 2017

The second Budget of 2017 delivered by Philip Hammond following the abolition of the Autumn Statement, was widely trailed as a tight political tightrope for...

Child Protection in the Digital Age

I was delighted when the Government introduced its Digital Economy Bill in the last session which gave effect to the 2015 General Election manifesto commitment...

A stake in it for everyone; why Conservatives should support regulation of Fixed Odds Betting Terminals

FOBTs or B2 machines are highly addictive, one way we know this, according to research conducted by the Campaign for Fairer Gambling, is that FOBT...

Championing renewed leadership in governance and business practice

It didn’t get to the point where we saw ‘Save Unilever’ held aloft on placards outside Downing Street, yet there was widespread unease about Kraft’s...

Industrial Strategy: A positive start but more must be done

The Government revealed their industrial strategy this week, with three main aims: Build on our strengths and extend excellence into the future; Close the gap...

Who can give the modern Cathy a home?

It’s 50 years since Ken Loach’s groundbreaking film, Cathy Come Home, documented the inhuman effects of homelessness. Without a home, as his heartbreaking film shows,...