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On the Shortcomings of Voting

Why electoral reform may well be necessary but certainly will not be sufficient

It seems that little has been done to rejuvenate the power balance between the two principal parties in Britain, Labour and the Conservatives. For many people, there is a risk that this will only fuel the impression that our politics is stagnant, repetitive and unresponsive to public opinion. The logical consequence will be increased calls for electoral reform, the likes of which have already been heard from the political class. However, the shape that any future reform may take should bear in mind the lessons to be learnt from the polling results.

On Friday morning's Radio 4 Today programme, Shadow cabinet minister Theresa May stated that “Labour has lost the election, they [the public] have rejected the Labour party. This is an historic result for the Conservatives.” In a certain respect she is not wrong: Gordon Brown's Labour party has been ousted from power. However, the results have certainly not been conclusive. Indeed, for many it may be rather surprising that despite pre-election approval ratings showing 66% of the electorate to be dissatisfied with the work of the government and 59% dissatisfied with the work of Gordon Brown as Prime Minister, we are still looking at a hung parliament in which Labour figures as the second strongest party.

If Labour have lost, then who has won the election? This is unclear. One explanation was to be heard, again on the Today programme, from Labour Cabinet Minister Lord Mandelson, who claimed the results demonstrate that “the public don't want any single party to have a monopoly of power.” He too, is not entirely wrong: the electorate has not decided univocally which party should rule. In summary, people seem to have wanted change, but not known what that change should be.

These results illustrate a central weakness of representational democracy. Each individual has one vote to cast. This vote operates, on the one hand, as a mechanism of retrospective vertical accountability: the citizen can hold the incumbent responsible for their past actions. It can be assumed that the Labour decline has come as the result of this retrospective accountability vote against them, reflecting the negative popular opinion felt during their last mandate. On the other hand, however, the vote also constitutes a prospective granting of authority: the citizen can back an incoming politician and their party by giving them support to carry out their promises for the future.

In a two-party race citizens have one vote with which to simultaneously punish one party and reward the other. Yet if they do not support either party, their choice is compromised: they cannot punish both. In the absence of a much hoped-for three party race, the 2010 election has followed this pattern, and faced with the choice of punishing the Labour incumbent and granting authority to the Conservative opposition, or blocking the Conservatives from power and approving another Labour mandate, the electorate has faltered with uncertainty. The choice facing voters was therefore constrained by a deficient political supply and by a compromised procedure.

As long as vertical accountability measures are tied to the granting of authority in this way, electoral choice will remain limited. At times when the political supply is deemed inadequate these problems are exacerbated and we are confronted with a hung parliament in which no party is clearly punished and no single party rewarded.

We must ask, first, how can the political supply be made more responsive to society's needs? And secondly, how can more efficient systems of checks and balances be established that enable granting of authority and holding to account of politicians without relying solely on the electoral system? The introduction of proportional representation may widen the political supply offer and improve the degree to which the British political system is deemed to be truly representative. Yet this institutional change will not be enough: it will have to be accompanied by the development of democratic participatory procedures to limit the perceived gap between parties and public, improving information sharing between citizens and politicians and making parties more responsive.

What form might these reforms take?

Comments on: On the Shortcomings of Voting

Gravatar Stephen Bosworth 26 February 2011
Also, in the light of this earlier blog, Simon, APR’s recognition of widely supported voluntary organisation in society might facilitate the development of the democratic participatory procedures” in a way that would help reduce “the gap between parties and public, [thus] improving information sharing between citizens and politicians and making parties more responsive.” APR is outlined in my late February posts on the ResPublica Blog (“Beyond AV: Associational Proportional Representation & Proportional Votes in the Commons”.
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Gravatar Stephen Bosworth 26 February 2011
Hi Alan,
Given the value you correctly place on an MP's "allegiance" to their voters, perhaps you would like to consider a PR system that does not have any of the flaws you correctly see in a "party list" system, namely, associationa proportional representation (APR). APR is outlined in my late February posts on the ResPublica Blog (“Beyond AV: Associational Proportional Representation & Proportional Votes in the Commons”.
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Gravatar Simon McMahon 09 May 2010
Thanks for the comments guys, I will try to add to answer some of them and pose some more questions to think about.

Firstly, yes: all choices need to be discussed and put forward by cross-party representatives. If just the party in power decides, we will see a reform that simply favours their situation. However, I think we should be careful when we talk about referenda. The same shortcomings of voting in elections apply to referendum voting, and more often than not the public does not decide on the issue at hand but rather the source of it, i.e: the political class or party.

Secondly, requiring MPs to be resident in their constituencies for 5 years seems to me to interpret society as a stable and unchanging entity. In reality people move all the time and community populations are dynamic and changing. We should ask how representatives can understand this, but I am not sure if restricting their residence would do so.

Finally, Alan Fraser rightly asks a vital question: in order to improve the political supply we must inquire as to how all political institutions, including the parties and not limiting ourselves to the State, can be made increasingly transparent, inclusive and participatory.
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Gravatar Alan Maher 09 May 2010
In my humble opinion (as someone from the the Antipodes), the Uk needs some electoral reform.
The MMP process in NZ has taken more than a year or two for most people to
understand, and now, we sit with a Govt. that most conservatives might
never understand in the UK.
It is an intersting process, and concept.
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Gravatar Dan 08 May 2010
Why not require MPs to have been resident in their constituencies for say the last 5 years, or some other similar rule? Parties would then have to select from a group of local activists who would be the MP should they get in under PR
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Gravatar Alan Fraser 08 May 2010
I think there's a problem with any system that creates additional distance between the rulers and the ruled. At the moment MPs are chosen partly by the parties (who nominate candidates) and partly by the voters (who vote for a candidate). MPs therefore have a dual allegiance - to their party, but also to their constituents.

Under 'classic' PR the power balance shifts further in favour of the parties and hence further away from the voters. This is because the voter votes for a party and the party then chooses who the representative is from the list of candidates they prepare. They might have a list of 650 candidates, but if they only get 30% of the vote then it's only the first 30% of names on the list who get elected. So the higher up the list you are the more chance you have of being elected.

This means that instead of having a dual allegiance the MP now has an overwhelming allegiance to the party. If s/he wants to get elected again s/he has to make sure they get as high up the party list as possible. Suddenly the possibility of an MP making a principled stand on behalf of their constituents disappears - their over-riding priority is to get their names as high up the candidate list as possible and this involves not creating waves for the party hierarchy.

One way of reducing that distance between the rulers and the ruled is open primaries to choose the candidates. This strengthens the link between the candidate and the voter and reduces the power of the party to 'parachute' in their preferred candidates to safe seats.

I would also suggest that under PR you would also want the primaries to have some effect on the order of the party list.

Finally, the power of recall (which all parties say they want) is also essential. You cannot have a system where the right of deselection of a candidate rests ONLY with the local party - although I believe that they should retain the right to make their candidate go through the primary process again.
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Gravatar Dick Lawrie 08 May 2010
There is a number of templates for electoral reform. They need to be examined by an all party group, explained and put forward and put forward to the public in referendum. How we vote is a matter for us and not fort a few right wing, aging and out-of-date politicians. Whilst we are being given a choice on that matter we should be given a choice of in or out of the EC.
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Date Published
08 May 2010

Categories
electoral reform

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